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Abstract
Because of the decrease in domestic production in Europe, additional natural gas volumes will be required.
In addition to Nord Stream, the major import pipeline projects, Nabucco and South Stream, have been
announced to provide further gas supplies to Europe. This raises the question concerning whether and how
these projects contribute to the European Union's focus on security of supply. Applying the natural gas
infrastructure model TIGER, this paper investigates the impact of these pipeline projects on southeastern
Europe's gas supply. Gas ows and marginal cost prices are evaluated in general and considering the possi-
bility of supply disruptions via Ukraine for the year 2020. The model results show a positive impact of these
pipelines on security of supply despite few consumer cut-os that result from intra-European bottlenecks.
South Stream is only highly utilized in case of a Ukraine crisis, supporting the idea that its main purpose
is to bypass Ukraine.
Keywords: Natural gas, security of supply, Nabucco, South Stream, linear-optimization, transport
infrastructure
JEL classication: L95, C61, Q41, Q34
1. Introduction and Background
The declining European gas production will lead to an increasing dependence on imports (European
Commission, 2008; IEA, 2008). Several plans for major pipeline projects will be commissioned in the next
decade to provide sucient capacity for additional natural gas imports, and investments in interconnections
among countries are planned to improve market integration. Moreover, several projects in focus should
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The author is solely responsible for the contents which therefore do not necessarily represent the opinion of EWI.
Email address: Caroline.Dieckhoener@uni-koeln.de (Caroline Dieckh oner)
1provide large-scale gas volumes from non-European gas producers to European regions. In addition to Nord
Stream, which is online in 2011, the Nabucco and South Stream pipelines are the largest projects planned.
Although both pipelines could enhance the security of the gas supply in the European Union (EU), they
are expensive projects. The ambitious objectives of the EU in terms of the percentages of renewables in
the energy mix by 2050 may lead to only a moderate growth in natural gas demand in the next decade and
probably to a signicant decrease by 2050. Natural gas demand for heating is even expected to decrease in
northwestern Europe until 2030 through implementation of energy eciency measures in buildings (Euro-
pean Commission, 2010). It follows that not all major pipeline projects may be essential for the security of
supply in Europe, especially the Nabucco and South Stream projects, which are designed to supply south-
eastern Europe.
A quarter of Europe's gas demand is satised by imports from Russia, and 80 percent of these volumes are
transported from Russia through pipelines via Ukraine (European Commission, 2006). The Russia-Ukraine
gas dispute of January 2009 caused an unprecedented disruption of gas supplies to the EU, described as the
worst gas crisis in International Energy Agency's (IEA) history (IEA, 2009). Disputes between Russia and
Ukraine on the pricing of the commodity natural gas and its transit to the EU were recurrent during the
past decade (Stern, 2009).
Because of these threats to the security of the natural gas supply, European policy will have to cope with sev-
eral challenges. First, gas supply from non-European countries has to be secured. However, since importing
a high proportion of gas volumes for the European market from one or only a few suppliers increases the risk
of political pressure and price increases, supply sources and means of transport to dierent European regions
should be diversied (Weisser, 2007; Reymond, 2007; European Commission, 2006). Political conicts, such
as the Russia-Ukraine crisis, could cause supply disruptions, and a halt to these transits has a signicant
impact on the European gas market, especially during times of high demand, such as the winter months.
To secure gas supplies, additional gas infrastructure, that is, liquied natural gas (LNG) import terminals,
storage areas, and major import pipelines, will have to be built (Lise et al., 2008; Cayrade, 2004).
This paper investigates the eects of each of the Nabucco and South Stream pipeline projects on European
natural gas supply security in general and with a particular focus on a Ukraine crisis simulation. The paper
also analyzes the major supply risks associated with the EU's dependence on the main transit country,
Ukraine, and the mitigating eects of Nabucco and South Stream and elaborates on the European gas
infrastructure system's vulnerability, as well as its ability to respond and compensate. The scenarios are
simulated with the European natural gas infrastructure and dispatch model TIGER from the Institute of
2Energy Economics, Cologne. The conclusions of the paper depend on these specic assumptions, in partic-
ular on assumptions on publicly announced infrastructure projects1 and on demand projections. Possible
eects of alternative assumptions are briey discussed in the conclusion.
The next section provides a literature overview on issues related to the security of supply in the context
of major European gas pipeline projects and describes the Nabucco and South Stream pipeline projects in
detail. Their contribution to the two objectives of European security of gas supply { the security of natural
gas imports and import diversication { is addressed. Section 3 describes the TIGER model which simulates
three infrastructure scenarios to analyze the eects of route diversication by Nabucco and South Stream
in case of supply disruptions: a baseline scenario without either of the two pipeline projects, a scenario that
implements only the Nabucco pipeline, and a scenario that implements only the South Stream pipeline. In
Section 4 the general eects of the Nabucco and South Stream pipeline projects { especially the eects on
marginal supply costs { are analyzed for the year 2020 for a hypothetical peak winter day, when supply dis-
ruptions are most probable. Section 5 analyzes the impact of the two pipeline projects during a hypothetical
Ukraine crisis on a peak winter day in 2020 on disruptions to consumers. Changes in marginal supply costs
and gas ows for the three infrastructure scenarios in comparison to the results of the no-crisis simulation
are presented. Section 6 concludes.
2. Security of natural gas supply and the Nabucco and the South Stream pipeline projects
2.1. Security of natural gas supply
The issue of security of supply in natural gas markets has been addressed by European energy policy
(European Commission, 2000, 2006; European Union, 2004). Dimensions of security of supply cover a
wide range of issues. Luciani (2004) denes security of supply as "the guarantee that all the gas volumes,
demanded by non-interruptible (rms or protected) customers, will be available at a reasonable price"
(Luciani, 2004, p. 2).
Thus, physical availability of natural gas and the price play signicant roles in guaranteeing security of
supply. However, dening a precise threshold for a threat of security of supply is a challenging task on which
academics have not reached agreement. Many studies have addressed the issue of security of energy supply,
albeit without a specic focus on natural gas (CIEP, 2004; Correlje and van der Linde, 2006). Gnansounou
(2008) develops a composite energy vulnerability index to benchmark industrialized countries in a long-term
security perspective regarding oil and gas supplies. Cabalu (2010) evaluates dierent gas supply security
1The data on capacities based on current planning status is taken from ENTSOG (2009).
3indicators. These cover gas intensity, net gas import dependency, a ratio of domestic gas production to
total gas consumption and the geopolitical risk for Asian countries. Cabalu (2010) introduces a composite
gas supply security index, based on Gnansounou's energy vulnerability index, that incorporates four of the
presented indicators to analyze an overall security of natural gas supply measure for Asia. For the European
market, Victor (2007) discusses aspects of global geopolitical security of supply for natural gas, but only a
few studies focus on specic pipeline projects. Holz et al. (2009) analyze European gas supplies until 2025
using the strategic model GASMOD and nd that pipeline availability remains a critical issue. Stern (2002)
analyzes the impact of dependence on natural gas imports and the inuence of liberalization on security of
gas supply and recommends a policy framework to prevent disruptions to consumers. He analyzes European
relationships with non-European gas-exporting countries and the inuence of a liberalized European market
on security of gas supply and dierentiates between short-term and long-term adequacy of supply and
infrastructure in the transport of gas to the demand regions. Stern (2002) also discusses operational issues,
such as stresses of weather and other operational inuences, and strategic security, such as catastrophic
default of infrastructure or supply sources. Further, associated with import dependence Stern distinguishes
among source dependence, transit dependence and facility dependence.
The current paper addresses transit dependence and facility dependence with a focus on the eects of the
two pipeline projects, Nabucco and South Stream,2 on security of supply. The major security of supply
risks associated with the EU's dependence on the main transit country of Ukraine (transit dependence) are
reected in the results of the Ukraine crisis simulations in which the mitigating eects of the Nabucco and
South Stream projects, the European gas infrastructure system's ability to respond and compensate, and
its vulnerability (facility dependence) are analyzed.
Stern (2002) addresses the problem of attributing costs to events that have a low probability of occurrence
but a high impact on supply and the diculties for policy makers to balance costs and risks in order to nd
measures to cope with these events. This paper presents an approach to the analysis of such events.
2.2. The Nabucco project
According to Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH (2010), the Nabucco project describes a gas
pipeline connecting the Caspian region, the Middle East and Egypt via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and
Hungary with Austria and further on with the Central and Western European gas markets. The pipeline
2Currently, there are three further "southern corridor" pipelines discussed, that could connect the Middle East or Caspian
Region with Europe: The Trans Adriatic Pipline (Trans Adriatic Pipeline, 2011), the Interconnection Turkey Greece Italy
Pipeline (IGI Poseidon, 2011) and the recently announced South-East Europe Pipeline (Financial Times, 2011). These pipelines,
however, connect only a part of the regions connected by Nabucco and South Stream.
4route with a length of approximately 3,300 km should start at the Georgian/Turkish and/or Iranian/Turkish
border and run via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to Baumgarten, Austria. The pipeline's transport
capacity is expected to amount to 31 bcm per year, and total investment costs are approximately 7.9 billion
Euros. From an EU point of view the Nabucco project should present an opportunity to diversify gas supply
options and to reduce the EU's dependence on Russia.3 The Caspian region, especially Turkmenistan and
Azerbaijan, and the Middle East-Egypt, Iran and Iraq, are discussed as supply sources for the project.
However, no supply contracts have yet been concluded, a fact that may aect the commissioning of the
project. Problems that have arisen in the context of suppliers for the Nabucco pipeline are often discussed
(Bilgin, 2009, 2007).
The Nabucco pipeline will be built only if sucient volumes are contracted. The political risk of defaulted
supply contracts is dicult to estimate and will depend on who the suppliers are. Turkey plays a major
political role in the negotiations on supplies because it will need signicant additional gas volumes in the
future to meet projected rising demand (and the country neither has an own production nor sucient gas
storage) and because Turkey is the rst transit country for the Nabucco pipeline. Turkey has already
been negotiating with the EU on the volumes that should be withdrawn from Nabucco to satisfy the
Turkish demand, and it has already signed and extended many of its gas contracts with its surrounding gas-
producing neighbors. However, Turkey is interested in withdrawing as much Caspian and Middle Eastern
gas as possible. Therefore, Turkey's geopolitical position could be both an opportunity and a threat for
the EU.4 Based on a geopolitical analysis, Bilgin (2009) recommends including at least two countries from
the Middle East and Caspian regions as suppliers for the European gas market, which could be possible via
Nabucco. Erdogdu (2010) analyzes strength and weaknesses of the Nabucco project with a focus on the
policies of dierent countries involved and concludes that its realization largely depends on non-European
actors and their interests.
In short, the Nabucco is an uncertain and cost-intensive project that could help to cope with the EU's
security of supply challenges because it could provide signicant gas volumes from non-European countries,
it diversies supply sources, and it diversies supply routes that transit mainly European Member States.
3The Nabucco project is designated as of strategic importance by the European Union in the Trans-European Networks -
Energy (TEN-E) programme.
4Karda s (2011) analyzes actual political Turkish-EU relations in the context of the Nabucco Intergovernmental Agreement
(IGA) and the discussion on Turkish-EU membership. He concludes that the latter has negatively aected an energy coop-
eration. However, he makes the point that the signing of the IGA in July 2009 gave indication for a better future energy
cooperation. Turkey reduced its claims on access to Nabucco volumes and on discounted prices whereas the EU agreed on
reverse ows on Nabuccco to Turkey and access to European gas stocks in case of emergency. Nonetheless, the future of
Turkish-EU relations in terms of Nabucco remain uncertain.
52.3. The South Stream project
A number of routes for the pipeline are being discussed, including onshore sections across the Russian
Federation and several European countries, as well as oshore gas pipelines via the Black Sea and the
Adriatic Sea. South Stream is expected to provide a capacity of 63 bcm per year by 2016 and to diversify
the Russian natural gas supply route to Europe, thereby strengthening European energy security (South
Stream, 2010)5. The source of Russian gas for South Stream is as uncertain as the source for Nabucco.
Natural gas production in the Volga Region is declining (Stern, 2005), and there will not be enough gas
for 63 bcm to be exported per year. For the coming decades, large explored gas reserves in Russia are
mainly in western Siberia and the Yamal Peninsula. Production in Yamal was approved to start in 2011 but
is delayed because of the economic crisis and the uncertainty on European demand developments (Pirani,
2010). Russian exports to Europe are not likely to be much higher than 200 to 220 bcm in 2020 (Socor,
2009). Another issue is that this area is more than 3000 km away from the start of South Stream at
Dzhubga. However, Russia is already importing Turkmeni gas and is also interested in purchasing gas
from Shah Deniz II, an Azerbaijani gas eld (Kupchinsky, 2009), which could also be used to supply South
Stream. In addition, to avoid transit and political costs, Russia could also consider transporting its gas
from the Yamal Peninsula to Europe via South Stream. However, Nord Stream, with 27 bcm (or 54 bcm
after the expansion), seems to be a much cheaper option for Russia because of the higher costs of Caspian
gas volumes and the long-distance of South Stream to future production regions. Moreover, Nord Stream
avoids the Ukraine and other transit countries in transporting the gas farther on within Europe and even
to southern Europe. Considering these circumstances, South Stream seems to be more a strategic option
than a cost-ecient one for transporting Russian gas to Europe. Barysch (2010) states that it is a political
project with the purpose to cut out transit countries like Ukraine and Belarus, and to prevent Nabucco
which threatens Gazproms monopoly.
About 80 percent of Russian gas exports go to Europe, and about 40 percent of EU imports stem from Russia
(IEA, 2009). Therefore, each party is dependent on the other, which may lower the default risk for Europe
and may be a lower risk than it would bear with contracts with Middle Eastern countries. However, South
Stream does not support the EU's goal of diversifying supply sources. Moreover, although South Stream's
planned extremely large capacity could be a strategic tool, it is not clear whether or how the pipeline could
be completely lled. In summary, South Stream oers the option to import large-scale (i.e., twice as much
as Nabucco) gas volumes from non-European countries, gas transported via South Stream would have to be
550 percent of the South Stream AG is owned by Gazprom.
6contracted with the mainly Russian state-owned natural gas company Gazprom, even if it originally stems
from a Caspian country, and South Stream oers an alternative route to the existing routes from Russia.
In general, the development of the European gas market is very uncertain with several risks for the planning
of pipeline constructions. In addition to the access to supply sources, European gas demand development in
the context of the EU's ambitous climate change targets and the role of unconventional gas remain uncertain
(Barysch, 2010).
3. Methodology
This section presents the framework and methodology for the model-based analysis that has been con-
ducted to identify the impact of the two pipeline projects Nabucco and South Stream on security of natural
gas supply. Thereby, importance of the routes and capacities of these two projects for security of supply is
identied. Regarding that both pipelines are major import routes in addition to the old-established route via
Ukraine, which is fraught with risk, their impact on security of natural gas supply in case of a hypothetical
Ukraine crisis is analyzed.
3.1. The TIGER-model
Dierent types of natural gas market models are presented in literature. Theoretical natural gas transport
optimization models include those presented by De Wolf and Smeers (1996), De Wolf and Smeers (2000),
Ehrhardt and Steinbach (2004), Ehrhardt and Steinbach (2005) and van der Hoeven (2004). Midthun
et al. (2009) present a modeling framework for analyzing natural gas markets that accounts for further
technological issues related to gas transportation { primarily the relationship between ow and pressure.
The mixed-complementarity models presented by Gabriel et al. (2005), Gabriel and Smeers (2006) and Holz
et al. (2009) focus mainly on modeling competition and agents with focus on natural gas trade determinining
supply volumes to the European market in dierent types of competitive environments. The results presented
in this paper for the year 2020 are based on simulations with the natural gas infrastructure model TIGER
(Transport Infrastructure for Gas with Enhanced Resolution). Developed by Lochner and Bothe (2007), it
enables an integrated evaluation of the utilization of gas infrastructure components { pipelines, storages and
terminals { and their interaction. Therefore, the model can be used for a comprehensive analysis of the short-
term supply situation and gas ows within the European long distance transmission grid. TIGER's focus is
on the optimal dispatch within the European gas infrastructure system.6 The results of the TIGER model
thus represent the rst best distribution of natural gas and utilization of infrastructure components within
6A similar modeling approach for the US market is presented by Ellison (2007).
7Europe assuming that the European Commission's regulative objective to achieve an ecient functioning of
the natural gas transport infrastructure within the next decades is accomplished.7
Maximum supply volumes to the European market, demand developments as well as capacity and start-
o dates of existing infrastructure and infrastructure projects are exogenous to the model. The results cover
ows in the pipeline system, the utilization of pipelines, LNG terminals, and the system of storage. The
infrastructure components are considered with respect to integration, and eects on marginal supply costs.
(See Figure 1 for an overview of the model.)
The marginal supply costs or nodal prices (Lochner, 2009, 2011) quantify how much it would cost to meet
an additional unit of demand at a specic node in terms of determinating the next cost-optimal solution to
satisfy this additional unit. Within the linear optimization framework, the marginal supply costs represent
the shadow costs on each node's balance constraint for each period. They indicate the marginal system
cost of supplying one additional cubic meter of natural gas to a specic node at a certain point in time.
These additional cost estimates thus cover the sum of all costs such as production, commodity, transport,
regasication or storage costs that are accumulated in the cost-minimal solution to meet the node-specic
additional unit of demand. Hence, they also account for opportunity costs. In a perfectly competitive and
eciently organized gas transport market, the marginal supply costs at each node in the system should be
equal to a theoretical wholesale price at that node. Therefore, an analysis of changes in marginal supply
cost indicates the eects the simulated scenarios could have on market prices in a perfectly competitive
market. If there is a disruption in supply, the marginal supply cost estimator rises towards innity within
the model.8 Based on marginal supply costs and disruptions computed, the model gives an indication where
additional infrastructure might be needed as a starting point for further cost-benet analyses.
3.2. Data assumptions
Demand, supply and infrastructure assumptions are based on EWI (2010a).9 The demand scenario used
is the EWI/ERGEG demand scenario, which is based on European Commission (2008) and adapted to the
economic crisis from 2009 on. The peak day demand assumptions applied are published in the Ten Year
7Fast steps into this direction have already been made by introducing and revising Gas Market Directives (European Union,
1998, 2003, 2009). A model validation presented in EWI (2010a) shows that the model can adequately reect real ows apart
from minor deviations. Ecient swaps in the model's pipeline system reect the higher willingness to pay in regions where
supply shortages occur in comparison to regions where supply is still adequate. In an ecient transport sector contracted
volumes will be resold to regions with a higher willingness to pay, if sucient transport capacity is available.
8A detailed description of the objective function, the main constraints, the computation of marginal supply costs, a list of
all cost components, their sources and application in the model is presented in the Appendix.
9For a detailed overview of additional primary sources applied in EWI (2010a), the parameterization, the cost assumptions
of the model, and the respective data sources, see Appendix B.
8Figure 1: TIGER-model composition
Network Development Plan of the European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSOG, 2009).
This is the highest possible daily demand level published and reects a worst case scenario in terms of
security of supply. In terms of pipeline projects in general { new pipelines, expansions and reverse ow
projects { the scheduled projects are included based on EWI (2010a) which are those projects that the
European regulators considered likely. With respect to the several intra-European pipeline projects and
planned expansions of interconnector capacities between countries, those published in ENTSOG (2009),
slightly adapted according to EWI (2010a), are implemented in the simulations. Table 1 gives an overview
of European demand, the maximum pipeline import volumes, as well as the aggregated European production
and infrastructure capacities that are available in 2010 and that are assumed to be online in 2020. The upper
limit of pipeline import volumes available to the European market is either predened by pipeline capacity
9restrictions or by the maximum export potential of the producer country.10
Table 1: European gas market in 2010 and assumptions for 2020
in billion cubic meter 2010 2020
Demand 489.1 533.31
Upper limit imports* 374,86 548.81/579.81**
from Russia 197.15 201.48
from Norway 121.22 112.82







from Middle East 15.5/46.5**
from Lybia 10.10 9.9
LNG import capacity 164.92 279.02
European production capacity 190.61 124.7
Storage working gas volume 85.17 140.39
Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE), BP (2011), Eurostat (2010), and EWI (2010).
All data refers to EU-27.
Data for 2020 sum up model inputs.
*Imports are restricted either by export potential or pipeline capacities.
LNG imports are only constrained by the capacity of regasication terminals (LNG import capacity).
**Only in Nabucco Scenario, based on the assumption that capacity to Turkey is extended then.
***From Caspian and/or Middle East.
3.3. Scenarios
To analyze the impact of the two pipeline projects three dierent scenarios are simulated:
 The Baseline Scenario uses the assumptions listed above and includes one line of Nord Stream with
an annual capacity of 27.5 bcm.
 The Nabucco Scenario is based on the Baseline Scenario, but it also assumes the Nabucco pipeline will
provide an additional 31 bcm in 2020. The route of Nabucco, based on data published by Nabucco
Gas Pipeline International GmbH (2010), runs from Turkey via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to
Baumgarten, Austria with several connections to the national grids that allow for withdrawal and
consumption of Nabucco gas along the way.
 The South Stream Scenario incorporates the South Stream pipeline instead of the Nabucco pipeline, but
it otherwise makes the same assumptions as the Baseline Scenario. The pipeline's route is implemented
as published by South Stream (2010) from Russia via the Black Sea to Bulgaria and from there on with
two dierent onshore connections: one via Serbia, Hungary and Slovenia to Arnoldstein in Southern
Austria and the other via Serbia and Hungary to Baumgarten, Austria. A pipeline connecting Greece
and Italy is included based on EWI (2010a). A third route of South Stream via Greece to Brindisi,
10More details on these assumptions, see EWI (2010a).
10Italy is assumed to be unlikely if the pipeline connecting Greece and Italy is commissioned. It is thus
not implemented in the simulations.
The three infrastructure scenarios are rst simulated allowing for supplies via Ukraine in order to generate
some general results and to establish a basis for comparison of the simulation of a hypothetical Ukraine crisis.
The evaluations presented in the following section are based on simulated daily gas ows.
4. Results of no-crisis simulation for 2020
This section rst presents general results on security of natural gas supply in Europe based on the Baseline
Scenario. Second, the Nabucco and South Stream Scenario are compared with the Baseline Scenario. The
results of the three infrastructure variations focus on a peak winter day in 2020, i.e. the day with the highest
demand and therefore the strongest impact on security of supply.
4.1. Baseline Scenario results of no-crisis simulation
Increasing import dependency has a crucial impact on security of natural gas supply in Europe in the
next decade which is shown in Figure 2 presenting the supply mix for 2009 and the simulated supply mix
for 2020. Russia's role as a major exporter to the European Union increases. Russia covers additional
11.5 percentage points of European gas supplies in 2020. These additional Russian volumes are mainly
transported via the Nord Stream pipeline (27.5 bcm in 2020), the Yamal pipeline via Belarus and Poland
(about 32 bcm) and via Ukraine. European production decreases especially in the UK, where production is
at 11.1 percent in 2009 and decreases to only 4.8 percent of EU-27 gas supply in 2020. Thus, intra-European
gas ows from the production regions in the UK and the Netherlands are decreasing and ows on all new
and existing pipeline import routes are increasing. Nord Stream causes a reduction of ows via the Czech
Republic in comparison to 2010. In 2020, the additional volumes sent via Ukraine are transported further
on to Hungary, Slovakia and Austria, to meet higher demand in this region.
The Baltic region, eastern Europe and Italy exhibit low marginal supply costs in comparison to Western
Europe in 2020 (see Table 2). Western European countries are distant from non-European gas producers
and the marginal unit of natural gas supplied to this region is comparatively cost-intensive because the
incurred costs cover either additional transport costs or relatively high LNG import costs. In the Balkan
region bottlenecks occurring on the peak day, the worst case scenario in terms of security of supply, lead to
disruptions to consumers. These occur because of a lack of interconnector capacities to the adjacent countries
relative to the high level of demand. The only import pipeline from Bulgaria to Former Yugoslavian Republic
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of Macedonia (FYROM) provides an average daily capacity of 2.6 million cubic meters per day (mcm/d),
which is not sucient to meet the Macedonian peak demand of 3 mcm/d assumed for 2020 by ENTSOG
(2009). The same holds for the interconnector from Serbia to Bosnia and Herzegovina with 1.9 mcm/d
compared with a peak demand of 2 mcm/d, and the Serbian demand of 20 mcm/d, which is signicantly
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































134.2. Nabucco and South Stream Scenario results of no-crisis simulation
The inclusion of Nabucco and South Stream in the simulation changes gas ows on major import routes.
Flows on Nabucco push Russian volumes further to the West and cause a higher utilization of the routes
via Ukraine and Slovakia. On the contrary, South Stream takes over volumes from these routes and sends
them directly to Bulgaria. In the Baseline Scenario these volumes are transported via Ukraine and further
on to Romania and Bulgaria. Figure 3 shows the gas volumes transported to the European market by
Nabucco and South Stream sorted by the countries where these volumes are withdrawn and consumed.
Nabucco and South Stream volumes remain in eastern Europe. Based on the cost-minimizing simulation
of a peak-day scenario without crisis, Nabucco brings more gas to the European market than does South
Stream. Nabucco volumes provide main supplies to Bulgaria and Hungary, as well as Turkey, and minor
volumes are withdrawn in Romania.
These volumes reduce marginal supply costs signicantly in eastern Europe, especially in Hungary and
Bulgaria (see Table 2). Only minor marginal supply cost decreases of around one percent can be observed
in Western Europe. Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg (BeNeLux countries), France, Spain and Portugal
are not signicantly aected by the commissioning of Nabucco. On average, marginal supply costs decrease
by 1.4 percent within EU-27.
South Stream only transports natural gas to Bulgaria and minor gas volumes to Serbia and Hungary (see
Figure 3). In opposition to the Nabucco, Scenario disruptions in Serbia are avoided in the South Stream
Scenario, which simultaneously causes slight average marginal supply cost increases (0.1 percent, see Table
2) in the European Union, especially in Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia and the Czech Republic because of the
rerouting of Russian volumes.
However, the disruptions in the Balkan countries Bosnia and Herzegovina and the FYROM cannot be
prevented on a peak winter day even with the inclusion of Nabucco and South Stream because both pipelines
bypass this region.
In summary, Nabucco and South Stream provide additional capacity and another option to transport gas
to the European market, so they both improve the supply situation in terms of changes in marginal supply
costs or the avoidance of disruptions, which are observed only in eastern and central Europe. Signicant
eects for Western Europe occur neither in the South Stream nor the Nabucco Scenarios.












































in million cubic metre on peak day
Turkey Bulgaria Romania Serbia Slovenia Hungary Austria Non-utilized capacity x
The negative values in the Nabucco crisis scenario indicate injections into the pipeline in Romania.
5. Results of Ukraine crisis simulation for 2020
Since about 80 percent of Russian gas to the European Union is currently transported via Ukraine, a
supply disruption on this route is the most threatening scenario for the European gas supply. Therefore,
the eects of a disruption of four weeks of gas imports via Ukraine on the locational marginal cost price
estimators are evaluated for the Baseline Scenario. Subsequently, the eects of the inclusion of the Nabucco
pipeline or the South Stream pipeline are investigated. The analysis of the simulation results is carried out
as a comparison of the three infrastructure scenarios.
5.1. Baseline Scenario results of Ukraine crisis simulation
A disruption of gas supplies via Ukraine causes major gas ow changes mainly in eastern Europe. Natural
gas is withdrawn from storages in eastern Germany and partly transported to Poland, the Czech Republic
and further on to the gas hub in Baumgarten, Austria. Storages in southern Germany provide volumes
15for Austria and volumes from western German storages are partly sent further on to Switzerland. Volumes
withdrawn in northern Italy remain in the domestic market. (See Figure 4 for the additional volumes
withdrawn from storages during the crisis.)
The respective changes in marginal supply costs analyzed result from a simulation with a stoppage of gas
supplies via Ukraine in comparison to a scenario without such a crisis. On a peak winter day, the simulated
four-week stoppage in gas supplies via Ukraine leads to disruptions to consumers and signicant eects
on marginal supply costs in large parts of southeastern Europe. For the Baseline Scenario presented in
Table 3, given the planned pipeline infrastructure expansions, a peak day scenario itself would already
cause disruptions in a no-crisis simulation (see Section 4). These peak day disruptions are aggravated in a
crisis simulation. Without a Ukraine crisis only 4 percent of peak day demand is disrupted in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 17 percent in Serbia and 27 percent in Macedonia, which increase to a complete disruption
of peak day demand in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia during a Ukraine crisis. In addition, in a
Ukraine crisis simulation, between 15 to 27 percent of consumers in Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary are
also cut o from gas supplies (see Table 3 and Table 4).
In Croatia, no consumers are disrupted. However, marginal supply costs indicate that disruptions would
occur at the margin if demand increases only slightly. Increases in marginal supply costs of more than 3
percent occur in eastern Europe, while Germany, the BeNeLux countries and Poland are confronted with
slight changes in marginal costs that result from the compensation through German storage volumes (see
Figure 4). Western European countries, which are supplied by Norwegian and Algerian pipeline gas as well
as LNG imports (i.e. UK, Ireland, Switzerland, Italy, Portugal, France and Spain) are not signicantly
aected by the crisis.
In the Baltic countries, Finland and Estonia, marginal supply costs even decrease by more than 40 percent
in the crisis simulation. Because of the cut-o of Russian volumes to Western Europe via Ukraine and
the available Russian export potential, these countries receive additional Russian volumes. In contrast to
marginal costs being driven by expensive storage withdrawals in a no-crisis simulation, these additional
Russian volumes lead to signicant reductions in marginal supply costs.
16Table 3: Change of marginal supply costs during crisis
Country* % change Baseline % change Nabucco % change South Stream
AT 4.23% 4.52% 1.28%
BA peak day disruption peak day disruption peak day disruption
BE 1.41% 0.53% 0.48%
BG crisis disruption marginal crisis disruption -1.92%
CH 0.58% 0.02% 0.03%
CS peak day disruption peak day disruption -1.87%
CZ 3.09% 4.74% 0.70%
DE 1.31% 1.42% 0.37%
EE -42.94% -40.59% -7.01%
ES -0.14% 0.07% -0.03%
FI -42.44% -40.08% -6.99%
FR -0.02% -0.11% 0.00%
GB 0.18% -1.06% 0.00%
GR crisis disruption crisis disruption -1.34%
HR marginal crisis disruption 3.37% -0.55%
HU crisis disruption crisis disruption -0.07%
IT 0.19% 0.31% 0.00%
IE 0.72% 0.37% 0.10%
LT -9.22% -9.38% -7.42%
LU 1.80% 0.73% 0.69%
LV -5.86% -5.78% -5.81%
MK peak day disruption peak day disruption peak day disruption
NL 1.37% 0.34% 0.47%
PL 1.13% 2.66% 0.01%
PT 0.03% 0.11% -0.02%
RO crisis disruption marginal crisis disruption crisis disruption
SI 4.33% 0.00% 0.64%
SK 8.39% 0.00% 3.89%
The wording "marginal crisis disruption" indicates that no volumes are disrupted,
but an additional unit would be.


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































185.2. Nabucco and South Stream Scenario results of Ukraine crisis simulation
The compensation for the missing Ukraine transits causes overall changes in the utilization of infras-
tructure components and gas ows. The dierences of supply volumes between the crisis and the no-crisis
scenario are presented in Figure 4. The compensation within the applied overall optimization framework
could even reduce the utilization of alternative infrastructure to the Ukraine route, which is indicated by
the negative bars. Therefore, including all changes between the crisis and no-crisis scenarios, the net length
of the bar in Figure 4 reects the aggregated compensated or disrupted volumes via Ukraine for each of
the three infrastructure scenarios. These aggregated volumes dier because the utilization of the Ukrainian
routes in a no-crisis simulation varies depending on the major pipeline available to supply the European
market. Without a Ukraine crisis South Stream already takes over some of the volumes that are transported
via Ukraine in the Baseline Scenario. Thus, in the South Stream Scenario, given that Ukraine transits were
already lower than in the Baseline Scenario, the missing volume { about 77 mcm/d less than in the Baseline
Scenario { must be substituted if there is a supply disruption via Ukraine. Rerouting of Russian gas volumes
and only a small proportion of withdrawal from storage in Germany and other European countries can then
substitute for the missing Ukrainian volumes. Rerouting here turns the volumes that have been transported
via Ukraine in the no-crisis simulation to another route from Russia in a crisis simulation.11 Thus, less
west-to-east gas ows take place with South Stream than in the Baseline Scenario and no signicant gas
ow changes occur in western Europe. Because of several bottlenecks in southeastern Europe, 15 million
cubic meters (mcm) less LNG are imported into the Krk terminal in Croatia and 13 mcm less gas is with-
drawn from eastern European storage on the peak day during the simulated Ukraine crisis. These supply
reductions are also compensated by additional supplies via South Stream.
11These routes could be Nord Stream, the Yamal route via Belarus and Poland to Germany, Blue Stream or South Stream
depending on the Scenario. In the South Stream Scenario, Russian gas is rerouted via South Stream because Nord Stream and
the Yamal route are completely utilized.
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The net length of the bars { positive part less the negative part { indicates the sum of the missing Ukraine transits and how
these are compensated.
South Stream being only poorly utilized in a no-crisis simulation oers generous redundant capacity dur-
ing a crisis simulation (see Figure 3 on page 15). During a halt of gas supplies via Ukraine, gas transported
on South Stream more than triples on a peak demand day, which demonstrates the extent of redundant
capacity available. Because of this alternative supply option, gas ows in west Europe remain mainly un-
aected by the crisis except for north Italy where the missing volumes are compensated for by storage
withdrawals and South Stream supplies. South Stream then provides less volumes for the Bulgarian market,
but signicant volumes for the Serbian, Slovenian, Hungarian and Austrian market. It eliminates persistent
supply disruptions in Serbia; avoids the crisis-induced disruptions that occurred in the Baseline Scenario
in Bulgaria, Greece and Hungary; and reduces increases in marginal supply cost signicantly in Slovakia,
Croatia, Austria and Germany. Disruptions to consumers can be observed in Romania due to a lack of
pipeline capacity from Hungary to Romania and South Stream bypassing Romania,12 although large vol-
12Gazprom and Romania have started negotiations on Romania joining the South Stream pipeline network. A feasibility study
20umes are transported to neighbouring Bulgaria. But the disruptions in Romania are reduced from 15 to
10 percent of peak day demand in comparison to the Baseline Scenario. Referring to the mitigating eects
these extra volumes have on the marginal supply costs and on disruptions to consumers, South Stream's
large-scale capacity has a signicant impact on security of supply in terms of transit country risks. So it
signicantly reduces the dependence on Ukraine. However, based on cost-minimization, even in a peak day
scenario South Stream is poorly utilized if other transport options from Russia are available.
By contrast, gas volumes transported via Nabucco do not have a crowding-out eect on Ukraine transits
in a no-crisis simulation, so the missing Ukraine volumes are much greater during a crisis simulation. These
missing volumes are mainly compensated for by withdrawals from storage in eastern Europe, Germany, Italy
and other European countries. Germany, which has the largest storage working gas volumes in Europe,
with more than 25 bcm, provides additional volumes during the crisis to be transported east. Nabucco
provides additional volumes for Italy and Austria, which in addition receive some volumes from northern
Italian storages during the crisis. In comparison to the Baseline Scenario more German storage volumes
can therefore be sent to northeastern Europe. In the Nabucco Scenario, in the simulated crisis on a peak
day, 10 mcm less volume than in the no-crisis simulation is rerouted from Russia, that is, transported on
a route other than the Ukraine route (Blue Stream in this case). The simulated Ukraine crisis causes a
bottleneck in the interconnector from Turkey to Bulgaria, which results in this decrease in Blue Stream
ows. Again subtracting these negative volumes from the positive bar for the Nabucco Scenario mirrors the
missing Ukraine volumes.
During the halt of Ukrainian transits, Nabucco gas supplies to Bulgaria and Turkey remain the same as
in the no-crisis simulation, and additional volumes are transported to Hungary and Austria (see Figure 3
on page 15). These additional volumes are mainly injected in Romania, as Nabucco is already completely
utilized from the start of the pipeline in a simulation without a crisis. Since some volumes are consumed in
Bulgaria, capacity is then available in Romania. The gas volumes injected into the pipeline are withdrawn
from storage in Romania, mainly to reduce disruptions in Hungary and to mitigate increases in marginal
supply costs in Austria. Introducing the Nabucco pipeline does not reduce the peak day disruptions that
result in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina13. However, during the simulated Ukraine crisis, disruptions in
will be worked out, but it is not yet clear whether this could result in a dierent route that excludes Bulgaria. (Euractiv.com,
2010)
13The Bosnian natural gas company BH-Gas has already shown interest in extending its gas supplies through connections to
major pipeline projects. It has asked Turkey's Bota to help it connect to the planned Nabucco and TAP pipelines in an eort
to diversify its gas supplies (Balkans.com Business News (2010)).
21Bulgaria, Romania and parts of Greece are avoided such that only increases in marginal supply costs occur,
rather than consumer cut-os. In addition, disruptions in FYROM are reduced from a 100 percent in
the Baseline Scenario during the Ukraine crisis to the peak day disruption level of 27 percent. However,
the improvement of market integration with Nabucco leads to minor increases in marginal supply costs in
Austria, Czech Republic, Poland and Northern Germany over the marginal supply costs in the Baseline
Scenario. Again, it is cost-ecient, within this modeling framework, to accept these slight increases in order
to prevent disruptions to customers in other regions.14
Additional consumer cut-os caused by the Ukraine crisis on the peak day are reduced by both South Stream
and Nabucco. In the Baseline Scenario about 54 mcm are additionally cut o during the crisis, but only
about 13 mcm are additionally cut o with Nabucco included, and South Stream's extensive capacity further
reduces the disruptions to about 9 mcm. (See Figure 4. These numbers reect the dierences between the
crisis and no-crisis scenarios in Table 4.)
6. Conclusion
The Nabucco and South Stream Pipelines are often discussed in the context of security of European gas
supply. The results of the simulations with the TIGER model show that security of supply in Eastern Europe
increases with the inclusion of either Nabucco or South Stream based on assumptions covering currently
publicly announced infrastructure plans. Nabucco reduces marginal supply costs in many Eastern European
countries and South Stream prevents disruptions to consumers in Serbia that occur in the Baseline Scenario.
However, consumer cut-os in some Balkan countries cannot be avoided by either Nabucco or South Stream
because these cut-os occur as a result of insucient interconnector capacity. These results are conditional
on the specic assumptions.15 Additional not yet announced interconnector capacity expansions that may
occur during the interim would mitigate or even prevent these consumer-cut-os. The same holds for a lower
demand scenario whereas signicantly higher demand could even worsen the disruptions.
Without either Nabucco or South Stream, the European market is strongly dependent on transits and on a
functioning pipeline system in Ukraine. Not even exible LNG imports can reduce this dependence because
of the bottlenecks that occur in the European pipeline system during a halt of Ukraine transits.
Generally, the inclusion of Nabucco and South Stream in model simulations of a Ukraine crisis both increases
security of supply and leads to a reduction of disruptions to consumers and to lesser price increases. The
14These eects reect a higher willingness to pay in regions confronted with supply shortages.
15Bottlenecks identied in the paper that might lead to disruptions refer to congestion which occurs in an eciently working
market. Potantial additional bottlenecks as a consequence of market ineciencies are not detected by the modeling approach.
22impact of these improvements varies signicantly over dierent European regions and is most eective
in southeastern Europe. Nabucco prevents disruptions in Bulgaria and Romania and South Stream in
Hungary, Serbia and Bulgaria. However, not all disruptions within the European market can be avoided by
these pipeline projects because of intra-European bottlenecks. Persistent disruptions remain in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia. These results are based on assumptions on
signicant demand increases in this region and publicly announced plans on infrastructure developments. A
connection of South Stream to Romania or (reverse ow) capacity from Hungary to Romania could mitigate
disruptions to consumers there. The same holds for a connection of Nabucco to the Serbian market or a
better integration of the Hungarian and Serbian market. Moreover, because of the signicantly lower capacity
of Nabucco, additional LNG volumes imported into Croatia would be needed to eliminate disruptions in
Hungary and Serbia, but these volumes could be transported only if bottlenecks in Croatia were removed.
The eects of the pipeline projects in Western Europe are small.
Based on cost-minimization, the model results show that South Stream, which is poorly utilized even on
a peak winter day in a no-crisis simulation, supplies primarily Bulgaria. However, South Stream oers
redundant capacity in a crisis simulation to reroute Ukraine transits during the simulated halt of supplies
via Ukraine. In the crisis simulation, South Stream is highly utilized, so it would be built primarily to bypass
Ukraine. Both pipeline projects enable a diversication of supply routes especially with respect to the main
routes via Ukraine and, if implemented, should contribute to securing gas supplies. However, only Nabucco
would reduce the dependency on Russian gas, assuming adequate alternative suppliers in the Middle East
and Caspian region were available to provide gas for the pipeline, and would support a diversication of
supply sources.
In summary, Nabucco and South Stream provide additional large-scale pipeline capacity in southeastern
Europe, but they also increase security of supply by extending supply options and mitigating the eects of
potential supply disruptions via Ukraine in this region. However, the attribution of relevant costs, apart
from relative changes in short-term marginal supply costs, and the probability of events that have high
impact on security of supply are not evaluated.
The determination of the optimal security of supply level by comparing marginal costs of investments into
the Nabucco and South Stream pipeline with marginal benets of additional security of supply provided
remains open for further research. For measuring these benets a detailed investigation on country-specic
demand proles and elasticities is needed, especially because of the uncertain demand developments in the
EU within the next decades. Moreover, an eciency analysis of a potential investment in the Nabucco and
23South Stream pipeline projects would complement a long-term economic analysis of security of supply.
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25Appendix A. Main equations of the TIGER model
The TIGER model developed by Lochner and Bothe (2007) optimizes the European natural gas dispatch
given the infrastructure components, i.e. long-distance transmission pipelines, storages and LNG import
terminals, minimizing the total costs of gas supply. A detailed model description can be found in EWI

























is minimized over the vector X = (T;P;St;LNGSt;LNGR;DD).
Gas supply and demand need to balanced. At each node, gas supply, that could either be storage with-
drawal, pipeline supply, LNG import or production, needs to equal gas demand. Thus, the Node Balance



























The marginal supply costs estimator at a certain node n1 at time t is the dual variable associated with the
Node Balance Constraint. The dual variable reects the increase of the Objective Function's optimal value
26by marginally increasing demand in the Node Balance Constraint. The dual variable is thus interpreted
as the shadow price of supply. For a more detailed model description with focus on the determination of
marginal supply costs (or nodal prices) see Lochner (2009) and Lochner (2011).
The following Technical Constraints must hold:
Production capacity constraint for t, n1 and p: For each y the sum of daily supply volumes from a production
region has to be smaller or equal to the annual supply capacity.
X
t
P(t;n1;p)  capannualsupply(n1;p) (A.3)
Daily production is constrained by daily peak capacity.
P(t;n1;p)  cappeaksupply(t;n1;p) (A.4)
Pipeline capacity constraint for t, n1 and n2: Transported gas volumes are restricted by pipeline capacity.
T(t;n1;n2)  cappipe(t;n1;n2) (A.5)
T(t;n2;n1)  cappipe(t;n2;n1)
LNG constraint for t, n1 and r: Similar to the supply constraints, LNG imports are restricted by daily and
annual capacity constraints.




LNG volumes to be imported are only restricted by LNG import capacity. The LNG costs assumptions
(presented in Appendix B) mirror a long term equilibrium and are therefore higher than pipeline costs.
LNG costs cover the costs of volumes on the tanker in front of the terminal.
Storage constraint for t, n1 and s: Storage volumes depend on withdrawals and injections of the previous
period and are restricted by storage specic working gas volumes.
St(t;n1;s) = St(t   1;n1;s) + StIn(t;n1;s)   StOut(t;n1;s) (A.7)
St(t;n1;s)  wgv(t;n1;s)
The storage level is determined by withdrawals and injections (minus compressor consumption) and restricted
27by working gas volume. The gas volumes injected into and withdrawn from the storages StIn(t;n1;s) and
StOut(t;n1;s) are a function of maximum injection and withdrawal rates and the storage level. The maxi-
mum injection and withdrawal rates depend on pressure and thus on the current storage level as well as on
the storage type. LNG storages operate in the same manner.
List of symbols
Sets and identiers
dr 2 D: demand region
n1 2 N: (start) nodes
n2 2 N: (end) nodes
p 2 P: production region
r 2 R: LNG regasication terminal index
s 2 S: storage index
t 2 T: time period (days in this model version)
Parameters
d(t;n1;dr): demand at node n in period t at demandregion d
ctrans(t;n1;n2): transportation costs between n1 and n2 in period t
cstor(t;n1;st): storage costs s at node n1 in period t
cLNGstor(t;n1;r): LNG storage costs at regasication terminal r at node n1 in period t
cprod(t;n1;pr): production costs in production region p in period t
rt(r): regasication tari at LNG import terminal r
dc(n1): disruption costs at node n1
cappeaksupply(t;n1;p): peak supply capacity at node n1 in production region p in period t
capannualsupply(y;n1;p): annual supply capacity at node n1 in production region p in year y
cappipe(t;n1;n2): pipeline capacity in period t from node n1 to node n2
cappipe(t;n2;n1): pipeline capacity in period t from node n2 to node n1
cappeakregas(t;n1;r) peak regasication capacity at terminal r at node n1 in period t
capannualregas(y;n1;r) annual regasication capacity at terminal r at node n1 in year y
28wgv(t;n1;s) working gas volume of storage s at node n1 in period t ,
Optimization Variables
T(t;n1;n2): gas volumes transported from n1 to n2 in period t
T(t;n2;n1): gas volumes transported from n2 to n1 in period t
P(t;n1;p): production at node n1 in production region p in period t
St(t;n1;s): gas volumes in storage s at node n1 in period t
StIn(t;n1;s): gas volumes injected into storage s in period t at node n1
StOut(t;n1;s): gas volumes withdrawn from storage s in period t at node n1
DD(t;n1): demand disruption at node n1 in period t
LNGR(t;n1;r): LNG volumes regasied in terminal r at node n1 in period t
LNGSt(t;n1;r): stored LNG volumes at regasication terminal r at node n1 in period t.
29Table B.5: Data and sources
Input data Specication of parameters Sources
supply export potential of EWI (2010a)
non-European production regions
and indigenous production
costs transportation costs Observatoire M editerran eean de l'Energie (OME) (2001)
and regasication taris
storage costs United Nations (1999)
production costs and EWI (2010a)
costs of gas supply from
a certain production region
demand annual demand European Commission (2008), EWI (2010a)
peak day demand ENTSOG (2009)
infrastructure all capacity assumptions and publicly available sources from pipeline, LNG
working gas volumes and storage operators and the respective
European associations' databases GLE, GTE and GSE
(see for instance Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE) (2010)
and see EWI (2010b) and EWI (2010a) for more details)
Appendix B. Parameterization and data sources
The TIGER model's input parameters for the simulations of this paper are based on the sources presented
in the following table:
Assumptions made on storages as discussed above in the context of the storage constraint were developed
with storage operators and are discussed in EWI (2010b).
Disruption costs are the most cost-intensive option to keep the node balance. The concrete level of disruption
costs does not impact the model results in terms of disrupted volumes as long as these costs are higher than
for alternative supply options. Disruption costs vary between countries depending on their demand structure
and type of demand (household, industry or power demand), on weather conditions and substitutive energy
carriers. Further comprehensive research is necessary to reect these aspects in precise disruption cost
estimations for the European gas market which was out of range within this study. Therefore only the
disrupted volumes are evaluated and not the costs of such gas demand reductions.
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